Legal Aspects of Human Genetics by Dworkin, Roger B. & Omenn, Gilbert S.
Maurer School of Law: Indiana University
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty Faculty Scholarship
1985
Legal Aspects of Human Genetics
Roger B. Dworkin
Indiana University Maurer School of Law
Gilbert S. Omenn
University of Washington - Seattle Campus
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the Genetics Commons, and the Medical Jurisprudence Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty
Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Articles by Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Dworkin, Roger B. and Omenn, Gilbert S., "Legal Aspects of Human Genetics" (1985). Articles by Maurer Faculty. 2474.
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/2474
Ann. Rev. Public Health. 1985. 6:107-30 
Copyright © 1985 by Annual Reviews Inc. All rights reserved 
LEGAL ASPECTS OF 
HUMAN GENETICS 
Roger B. Dworkin 
Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington, Indiana 47405 
Gilbert S. Omenn 
School of Public Health and Community Medicine, University of Washington, Seattle, 
Washington 98195 
INTRODUCTION 
Knowledge of human genetics , the relative prevalence of genetic disease, and 
clinical genetic services have increased dramatically in recent years. Many of 
the 3-5% of newborns with significant congenital anomalies have conditions 
that are genetic. The proportion of infant deaths from genetic causes is esti- _ 
o
. _ -
mated to have risen from 7% in 1915 to about 20% today, largelj'.because·ofthe 
reduction of infant deaths from other causes. Genetic disorders are major 
causes of death in the 1-4 year age group. Twenty-five to 30% of under 
18-year-old and perhaps 13% of adult acute care hospital admissions are for 
genetic or genetically influenced conditions (53, 78, pp. 803-4). 
As genetic disease has increased in importance,  so too have methods for 
dealing with it. Genetic screening, genetic counseling , prenatal diagnosis, new 
reproductive technologies , conventional therapies , and potentially even gene 
therapy offer hope and information to an ever-increasing number of families. 
With increased knowledge and increased hope, however, come increased 
responsibilities, occasional disappointments, and ethical dilemmas (52a, 57). 
Disappointed persons may seek to use the law to establish responsibilities and 
to obtain compensation. Similarly, disputes over ethical and moral values may 
be transformed into legal actions. 
In this chapter we examine some of the legal issues posed by new develop­
ments in human genetics and make some tentative observations about where the 
law may be headed. The law of human genetics is very new and largely 
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108 DWORKIN & OMENN 
undeveloped. Therefore, any conclusions expressed here are highly specula­
tive. Also, the law varies from state to state. Persons with specific questions 
should consult an attorney in their own jurisdiction. 
ADVANCES IN GENETIC SERVICES 
Clinical genetics has blossomed as a field of medicine during the past 20 years 
as a result of remarkable scientific progress and numerous practical applica­
tions of genetic principles in diagnosis, treatment, and counseling of patients 
and their families (75a, 80). More than any other field except perhaps infec­
tious diseases and traumatic injury, genetics bridges clinical medicine and 
public health ( 16a, 57, 60a). The individual patient is almost always considered 
part of the larger unit of the family or broader community. Genetic disorders are 
no longer viewed as rare and exotic , untreatable and inevitable. A much more 
activist approach to at least some of these diseases is feasible now, and 
treatments drawn from the full array of the medical and surgical armamentar­
ium have been applied. Many treatments depend on knowledge of the biochem­
istry or enzymology of the disease; others involve surgery in circumstances of 
early diagnosis; still others utilize manipUlation of the diet or manipulation of 
the immune response (53a). 
Against this background, the relatively simple procedure of amniocentesis 
has revolutionized the practice of clinical genetics and genetic counseling and 
enhanced interest in genetic screening (53b). With this procedure to sample 
fetal cells from the amniotic fluid, specific tests of chromosomes,  DNA, 
enzymes,  and other proteins can be applied to pregnant women at "high risk" of 
delivering infants with certain birth defects or other genetic disorders. Pre­
viously, the physician could offer only statistical estimates of the likelihood of 
occurrence or recurrence of these disorders; now prospective parents can learn 
whether the fetus is affected or not affected. It must always be emphasized, 
however, that these tests cannot guarantee a "normal" baby, since there are 
many disorders for which no tests are available. 
Amniocentesis should be performed by a skilled obstetrician only after the 
patient (couple) has received appropriate genetic counseling and has given 
informed consent. The safety and efficacy of this procedure were studied 
intensively as the technique was being introduced, a model of technology 
assessment in medicine. The timing, at 14-17 weeks of pregnancy, is deter­
mined by the time of appearance and accumulation of sufficient amniotic fluid. 
Chromosomal or biochemical studies generally require about 3 weeks to 
complete in the laboratory, so the couple must wait until the seventeenth to 
twentieth week of pregnancy to learn the results. Major indications for mid­
trimester amniocentesis are listed in Table 1. 
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LEGAL ASPECTS OF GENETICS 109 
Table 1 Indications for midtrimester amniocentesis 
Cytogenetic studies on cultured amniotic fluid cells 
Mother's age> 35 
Previous child with Down syndrome 
Family history or carrier status for chromosomal disorder 
Determination of sex in X-linked disorders 
Biochemical studies on amniotic fluid 
Previous child with neural tube closure defect 
Linkage study for myotonic dystrophy 
Enzymatic analyses on cultured amniotic fluid cells 
Previous child with testable inborn error of metabolism 
Couple at risk for Tay-Sachs disease, detected by population screening 
Gene studies on cultured amniotic fluid cells 
Couple at risk for (X -thalassemia 
The complexities that arise with new tests can be illustrated with the alpha­
fetoprotein (AFP) test for detection of neural tube closure defects (open spine, 
spina bifida, anencephaly). AFP is a normal plasma protein that is thought to 
"leak" into the amniotic fluid through neural tube defects. Some crosses into 
the maternal circulation. Instead of a qualitative change in chromosome pattern 
(such as trisomy 2 1  in Down syndrome), this disorder presents with a quantita­
tive increase in measurable AFP in amniotic fluid and in maternal serum. 
Testing for increased AFP was rapidly accepted for prenatal diagnosis of 
fetuses in families with a previous,  severely affected child (recurrence risk 
about 4%). However, there was a question of whether to do this test when 
amniocentesis was indicated to rule out Down syndrome or some other specific 
testable disorder. The fluid was already available, so it seemed desirable to add 
this inexpensive test. Since the general population incidence is only 0 .2% ,  
there i s  a problem with false positives and false negatives, a s  i n  most quantita­
tive assays, and the normal range is influenced by gestational age and several 
other factors. Should a test be performed that the parents did not seek? 
It was soon recognized that the appearance of AFP in maternal serum could 
be monitored as a means of screening to detect high-risk pregnancies before the 
couple ever had experienced the birth of an affected child. From a public health 
point of view, this screening approach is far more effective in reducing the 
incidence of neural tube defects than is waiting until a case has occurred in a 
family before beginning to test. Like all other screening tests, the population 
incidence, the specificity and sensitivity of the test, and the scheme for 
confirmation and management of the cases become crucial; these matters have 
been discussed in a previous volume of the Annual Review of Public Health by 
Holtzman et al (39b). Maternal serum screening for AFP has been introduced as 
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110 DWORKIN & OMENN 
a routine part of obstetric care in the United Kingdom, but its introduction in the 
United States was delayed and has been rejected because of the lower popula­
tion incidence and attendant higher proportion of false positives and because of 
the lack of organized public health service networks in this country. An 
additional twist in this case was the tortuous path for FDA approval of a test kit 
for AFP. Obstetricians opposed approval for fear of liability should the tests not 
be done or should tests be interpreted inappropriately; pediatricians and clinical 
geneticists insisted that approval should be tied to requirements for genetic 
counseling and follow-up; but organized medicine (the AMA) objected to the 
FDA's efforts to respond to these positions by placing certain constraints on 
this aspect of the practice of medicine! A test kit was finally approved, with 
instructions that testing be closely tied to genetic services. 
Another eye-catching indication for amniocentesis in Table I is the deter­
mination of sex. This is a simple matter, since male and female fetal cells differ 
in their chromosome complement (46,XY for males; 46,XX for females). At 
present, amniocentesis followed by chromosome analysis for sex is used only 
in the very specific circumstances of X-linked recessive disorders of which the 
mother is known or thought to be a carrier and for which no biochemical test is 
available .  The parents seek such testing in order to learn whether the fetus is 
female, indicating a daughter who will be unaffected (either genotypically 
normal or a carrier, like the mother) , or a male. They will have already decided 
to consider terminating the pregnancy of a male fetus , despite the fact that they 
cannot know whether that fetus is affected or entirely normal. Examples of 
diseases for which this indication applies are Duchenne muscular dystrophy, 
hemophilia, and Lesch-Nyhan disease. Obviously the same testing could be 
applied to pregnancies by couples simply wanting to know the sex of the baby 
or wanting to terminate a pregnancy of undesired sex, either male or female. A 
few such requests have been experienced at most genetic counseling centers 
around the country, but most inquirers desist when they are informed that the 
test cannot be performed until well after the mother experiences "kicking" by 
the baby and that results would not be available until 18-20 weeks of pregnan­
cy. The use of ultrasound visualization of the fetus ,  essential for fetoscopy and 
helpful in amniocentesis, vividly demonstrates the viability of the fetus and 
may well accelerate maternal/fetal bonding. 
Thus , the late timing of amniocentesis helps assure that only serious prob­
lems will be addressed with this procedure, even though it would be desirable in 
many cases to be able to help the couple with information as early as possible in 
the pregnancy, whether they go ahead with the pregnancy (the vast majority, 
given the high odds of reassuring test results) or not. There is no question that 
the overriding social and political issue facing prenatal diagnosis is the con­
troversy over abortion . Some parents who find abortion unacceptable in other 
circumstances choose to terminate a pregnancy in which the fetus is proved to 
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LEGAL ASPECTS OF GENETICS 1 1 1  
have a severe birth defect. Some couples are willing to have additional children 
only with the assurance that such testing is available. Others seek prenatal 
diagnosis,  even though their personal and religious views preclude termination 
of the pregnancy, in order to prepare for the birth of an affected child with 
special needs. 
First trimester testing is now becoming feasible with a procedure known as 
chorionic villus biopsy. A variety of techniques for chorionic villus sampling 
(CYS) has been reported from China, USSR, France, UK, Italy, and the US 
(8a, 59a, 64a). A CVS Newsletter in conjunction with the Hereditary Diseases 
Section of the World Health Organization (WHO) shows a high level of 
international interest, since this procedure can be carried out on unanesthetized 
outpatients, offers information early in the first trimester, may be applicable for 
major disorders in developing countries (such as thalassemias and sickle cell 
disease) , and may find greater social and legal acceptance than has amniocente­
sis in certain European countries (64a). Ironically, development of these 
techniques was delayed a decade when systematic studies demonstrated the 
safety and efficacy of amniocentesis. 
In brief, chorionic villus sampling involves insertion of an endoscope 
through the vagina and uterine cervix to permit needle aspiration of villi from 
either the implantation site (chorion frondosum) or the extraplacental chorion 
(which will degenerate). A successful biopsy yields fetal tissue uncontaminated 
with maternal cells and with minimal risks . The expcnsive aspect of the 
technique is the use of real-time ultrasound to identify the implantation site and 
to guide the endoscope. The risk of damage to the placenta can be avoided by 
sampling the degenerating extraplacental chorion, but that tissue may give 
unreliable results. The risk of increasing the "normal" rate of spontaneous 
miscarriage must be considered and investigated; preliminary results are quite 
encouraging, though there are sometimes technical difficulties in negotiating 
the cervical canal and reaching the chorion frondosum. Great care must be 
exercised to rule out maternal contamination from the passage through the 
endocervical canal. The optimal time for sampling appears to be 9-10 weeks of 
pregnancy (from the last menstrual period). Extensive investigation will be 
necessary to demonstrate for which enzymes these biopsy specimens reflect the 
characteristics of cells tested in midtrimester or after birth. Some diagnoses will 
be feasible by detecting mutations of polymorphic markers in the DNA itself. 
Chorionic villus biopsy offers the advantages of direct biochemical chromo­
somal analyses without the time-consuming cell culture step required for 
amniotic fluid. 
As this technique comes into wide use (about 1000 pregnancies tested 
worldwide as of April 1984), public demand for this service may grow rapidly, 
far exceeding amniocentesis demand. The likelihood of use for determination 
of fetal sex will be greater. The diffusion of the technique to obstetricians 
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112 DWORKIN & OMENN 
unassociated with counseling centers may increase the risk of misunderstand­
ings and subsequent litigation. 
These techniques for prenatal diagnosis will be essential for intrauterine 
therapies that are being developed. Rare vitamin-responsive inborn errors of 
metabolism may be treated by administration of large doses of vitamin to the 
mother; oral cyanocobalamin (B u) was used to treat methylmalonic aciduria in 
this way (53b). Surgery on the fetus is becoming frequent, especially for 
congenital defects affecting the urinary tract. The direct tie to first trimester 
genetic diagnoses, however, may come with further advances in the introduc­
tion of specific genes. Candidates are those for adenosine deaminase and purine 
nucleoside phosphorylase (deficiencies cause immune deficiency), hypoxan­
thine-guanine phosphoribosyl transferase (deficiency causes the Lesch-Nyhan 
syndrome of ment?} retardation, self-destructive behavior, and gout), and 
citrullinemia and other blocks in ammonia metabolism (which cause mental 
retardation) . These genes have been cloned; they may function without the 
precise intracellular regulation that should be required for the globin genes 
(sickle cell disease, thalassemia) or immunoglobulin genes; and retroviruses 
may be useful carriers (46a). The problems lie in finding suitable means of 
introducing the genes to target tissues, means of assuring their expression at 
adequate levels, and criteria for determining when and how to begin such 
experiments with human beings ( l a, 58). 
GENETIC MALPRACTICE 
Persons disappointed with the outcome of genetic screening or genetic counsel­
ing may seek compensation by bringing a malpractice suit against those they 
believe are responsible. 
The law of malpractice, including genetic malpractice, is part of the law of 
torts. Stated overs imply , tort law has two primary goals: the reduction of the 
likelihood of harm in society and minimization of the impact of those harms 
that do occur. Behaviorally, the law assumes that the risk of liability will 
encourage safe behavior. Economically, it assumes that losses are less devas­
tating if distributed, for example, from the patient who is injured, through a 
doctor and an insurance company, to the company's policy holders (other 
doctors), and eventually to all patients in the form of increased health care 
costs, than if left to be borne entirely by the injured patient. 
Since avoidance and allocation of losses are the primary goals, the first legal 
questions to ask in a medical genetic context are: what are losses, who may 
suffer them, and how much are they worth . 
Claimants and Injuries 
Six types of persons may plausibly be expected to assert claims in the genetic 
disease context: 
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LEGAL ASPECTS OF GENETICS 1 13 
1. A patient whose own care could have been improved by a correct 
diagnosis or provision of adequate, accurate information. Such a patient's 
injuries give rise only to the same kinds of evaluation questions that arise in any 
case of misdiagnosis or misinformation .  They are not affected by the genetic 
nature of the disease and will not be discussed further here. 
2 .  Parents who abort a healthy child because they received erroneous or no 
genetic information or prenatal diagnosis. These claimants have obviously 
been injured. They are unlikely to receive substantial compensation, because 
the law has taken a very restrictive position on compensation for the'death of 
unborn children ( 1 , 48); however, the law is becoming less restrictive in this 
regard . If a practitioner were consciously to adopt a policy of erring on the side 
of encouraging abortion by overstating risks, substantial liability , including 
punitive damages, likely would be imposed. 
3. Parents who bear an affected child because they received erroneous or no 
genetic information or prenatal diagnosis. These are the most likely claimants. 
Liability to them may be substantial. These parents will claim both economic 
and emotional loss from the preventable birth of an affected child. Economic 
loss includes the full range of special medical , custodial , and training costs the 
child may require over a lifetime (4, 62, 66, 67). 
Emotional distress damages raise a harder question. Some courts allow 
recovery because of the clear legitimacy of the parents' claim and the fore­
seeability of the emotional suffering that negligent genetic counseling that leads 
to the birth of an affected child will cause (5). Others deny compensation 
because of the difficulty of measuring emotional loss in financial terms and a 
fear of faking (4 1). The view that results in compensation seems likely ulti­
mately to prevail.  The opposite approach is rooted in old doctrine that de­
veloped in nonmedical contexts. It is out of step with modem tendencies to 
provide fuller compensation to injured persons and to recognize the legitimacy 
of protecting interests beyond the merely physical. 
A fair prediction seems to be that parents who would have refrained from 
conceiving or who would have aborted an affected fetus if given correct 
information, but who conceived or did not abort because of negligent failure to 
provide information or the negligent provision of incorrect information, will be 
permitted to recover both their economic losses and compensation for their 
emotional distress. 
4. Siblings of an affected child. Siblings may claim that the birth of an 
affected child into the family deprived them of their fair share of parental 
attention and money. Such claims are probably not compensable ( 17), except 
perhaps in California (22). 
5. The affected child. Acting through a guardian , an affected child may sue 
for "wrongful life," alleging that he would have been better off never to have 
been born than to have been born in his actual condition (63a). Until 1982, this 
claim was rejected every place it was litigated (4, 25, 27, 30). Courts generally 
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114 DWORKIN & OMENN 
reject the claim because damages are too difficult to measure, as they cannot 
compare the monetary value of an injured life with the void of nonexistence , 
and because of the view that life is always better than nonlife .  Neither of these 
arguments seems persuasive . Courts have long awarded damages for un­
measurable injuries, such as pain and suffering; nothing prevents them from 
doing so here. And a preference for life at any cost is hardly consistent with 
recent developments favoring a patient's "right to die" in some circumstances, 
which has been gaining considerable judicial (50, 56, 68) and legislative ( la,  
56) support nationwide. 
Nonetheless, in at least one type of case a good reason to deny recovery to the 
child may exist . If the child's condition is one that will cause him to die early in 
life, the practical effect of compensating the child is to compensate his estate , 
which, of course, will be his parents. Since the parents have their own claim to 
compensation for their injuries, such a result would constitute a windfall to 
them. Moreover, by requiring compensation when no independent loss exists to 
compensate, this result would unnaturally inflate the costs of medical care . The 
system strives to make each activity pay its true costs, not to distort the market 
by imposing additional ones. 
Three states, California (71), Washington (37), and New Jersey (58a), have 
now recognized a child's claim for wrongful life , but each state has been careful 
to avoid multiple recoveries and to limit the size of awards. The courts only 
awarded the children actual economic losses for care and training .  They denied 
claims for so-called "general damages" to compensate a child for pain , suffer­
ing, loss of dignity , etc; and they specifically limited out-of-pocket awards to 
either the child or the parents , not both. Thus, the California, Washington, and 
New Jersey cases have only a slight practical impact. They provide financial 
care for the child regardless of the availability of the parents, and go no farther. 
Logically, however, no sound basis exists to deny general damages once the 
legitimacy of the child's claim has been recognized. Therefore , a future court is 
likely to permit such an award, dramatically increasing potential liability . 
However circumscribed the damage award may be , if the wrongful life cause 
of action is recognized, many questions about it remain unresolved. First, how 
severe must the child's defect be to permit compensation? The three cases to 
date have involved hereditary deafness, fetal hydantoin syndrome, and con­
genital rubella syndrome. What else will qualify? Four possible answers, none 
of which is acceptable, present themselves: 
(a) The child will only be compensated if its condition is so bad that life is 
worse than no life . Courts will be loathe to make such assessments, and the 
cases already decided show that some other standard is being applied. Few 
would consider deafness a fate worse than death. 
(b) The child will only be compensated if its condition is so bad that its mother 
would have obtained an abortion had she been properly informed. This test 
is unacceptable because it gives mothers an incentive to lie and allows a 
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LEGAL ASPECTS OF GENETICS 1 15 
child's claim to be determined by his mother's religious and moral views 
and her perception of a particular anomaly. 
(c) The child will only be compensated if its condition is so bad that a 
reasonable mother would have obtained an abortion if she had been proper­
ly informed. This is really only the first approach stated differently. No 
court can say which conditions require a reasonable mother to abort. 
(d) Any child will be compensated for any unusual medical or educational 
expense that proper genetic counseling and prenatal diagnosis could have 
avoided. This approach will lead to uncontrollable, unpredictable recover­
ies for countless trivial imperfections. It is unworkable. 
The courts have not yet begun to grapple with this question of how severe a 
child's condition must be before the child can be compensated. 
A second question posed by the recognition of a claim for wrongful life is 
whether the child has such a claim against anyone other than the involved 
medical personnel. Specifically, may the child recover from his parents for 
being born with a defect (5 1, 63)? An intermediate appellate court in California 
answered that question in the affirmative (2 1). That case involved alleged 
negligence by a medical laboratory , which performed Tay Sachs testing. The 
court went out of its way to observe that if a case should arise in which all 
medical personnel performed properly,  but the parents nonetheless chose to 
bear an affected child, the parents should have to compensate the child for the 
injury they caused it. This suggestion was rejected promptly by the California 
legislature (9). It seems inconsistent with notions of free choice in reproductive 
decision making (59), implies an obligation to obtain an abortion, and raises the 
spectre of extraordinary involvement in women's lifestyle decisions. No other 
court seems likely to adopt such an extreme position. 
Nevertheless, some courts have imposed obligations on mothers to their 
unborn children (34, 45, 5 1, 63), and in some circumstances such obligations 
may be appropriate. For example, some persons may think it appropriate to 
impose liability on a mother with PKU who causes brain damage to her child by 
refusing to follow the low-phenylalanine diet during pregnancy. Thus, the 
question of parental obligations to unborn children is not yet fully resolved. 
6. Relatives (and potential relatives) of patients. These persons may seek 
compensation for the failure of someone in the genetic counseling process to 
inform them of risks the counselor learned about from evaluating a patient . 
These claims raise questions about sharing information, and we discuss them in 
that context below. 
Negligence 
Whoever the claimant is, the genetic counselor or other defendant will only be 
liable to him if the defendant was negligent. What constitutes negligence in the 
genetic disease context is by no means clear. 
Negligence means unreasonably dangerous conduct. What is reasonable for 
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116 DWORKIN & OMENN 
doctors practicing medicine is usually, but not always, measured by the 
ordinary behavior of other members of the same specialty, traditionally in the 
same or a similar community as the defendant (28 , 65), but increasingly in the 
nation as a whole (64). Different standards are applied to different specialists 
(8). In the genetic disease area one would expect the highest standards to be 
imposed upon persons who claim expertise in medical genetics . Obstetricians, 
pediatricians, family practitioners, and others who deal often with genetic 
disease are also likely to be held to high standards of performance. 
Unfortunately, specific answers to questions about what may constitute 
genetic negligence cannot be provided in advance. Case law to date provides no 
answers. Some cases, such as failure to take care properly to label laboratory 
samples, are clear examples of negligence. Most cases are not so easy . 
Perhaps the most relevant questions are, how much genetic information must 
one know, and how forthcoming with that information must one be. As to the 
former, one clearly must know what others in the field know, so that as 
knowledge of genetic diseases increases, more and more physicians will be 
responsible for knowing more and more about them. One must also know what 
one claims to know. If a patient asks a question and the doctor answers it, the 
doctor is responsible for the accuracy of the answer (4). Finally, sometimes a 
doctor will be expected to know that he lacks sufficient expertise properly to 
handle the patient's case. In such a situation the doctor must seek consultation 
or refer the patient to an appropriate person. 
The law does not reveal when a physician must raise a genetic issue with a 
family and when he may wait to be asked. Physicians probably have a duty to 
inform pregnant women over 35 of the increased risk of Down syndrome and of 
the availability of prenatal diagnosis for it. As to other conditions and tech­
niques, all that can be said is that the law increasingly emphasizes full patient 
information and freedom of choice (11, 14, 79); this suggests that the prudent 
course for a doctor to follow is to overinform rather than underinform his 
patients. 
Negligence law in general and malpractice law in particular are moving 
toward ever easier imposition of liability. This trend toward easier tort recovery 
coupled with the rapid expansion of medical genetic know ledge and techniques 
suggest that substantial liability for genetic malpractice is likely. Maximizing 
one's own education and taking care to engage in serious genetic history taking, 
screening, diagnosis, and referral will reduce the risk of liability by reducing 
the risk of error . As long as the courts continue to pursue loss distribution 
policies, however, no amount of care can guarantee immunity from liability. 
SHARING GENETIC INFORMATION 
Some of the most difficult problems posed by genetic medicine involve the 
sharing of genetic information with the patient and others . Genetic diagnostic 
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LEGAL ASPECTS OF GENETICS 117 
techniques often reveal sensitive information that the counselor may prefer to 
keep from the patient. For example, diagnostic procedures may reveal that a 
married woman's husband is not the father of her child, that a male fetus or 
baby has an XYY chromosome configuration, or that a healthy fetus is of a sex 
the parents do not prefer. Must the counselor disclose this information to the 
patient (57)? 
Surprisingly little law exists about patients' access to their own medical 
records. The usual view is that the physician owns the records themselves, but 
that the patient will be granted access to the information in the records, at least 
if he has a medical reason for wanting it (32, 52). These standard rules are of 
little help in the genetic counseling context. 
For diagnosis to reveal nonpaternity the husband and wife must both have 
been evaluated, and both may have sought counseling services. Which one is 
the patient? To whom does access to information belong? Answers to these 
questions can only be sought through analysis of the probable consequences of 
different courses of action. 
If the counselor withholds the information, lies, or makes up an implausible 
story (for example, that the baby carries a new mutation), and the husband 
eventually learns the truth, he may have a valid claim against the counselor for 
the costs of raising the child, emotional distress , and punitive damages. In 
some states, however, an irrebutable legal presumption that a child born to a 
married woman is legitimate may preclude recovery . Conversely, if the coun­
selor does reveal the information, the mother's claims for invasion of privacy or 
intentional infliction of emotional distress will be weak because legal require­
ments of pUblicity in the privacy case and extreme and outrageous conduct in 
the emotional distress case cannot be met. Thus, telling the husband the truth is 
probably safer than withholding the information. This is consistent with con­
ventional ethical norms about truth telling and with judicial preferences both 
for honesty and for full disclosure of information. 
The XYY and fetal sex problems are also difficult. In the XYY setting a 
counselor may be reluctant to disclose information of ambiguous significance, 
which might lead either to an abortion or to a self-fulfilling prophecy of 
criminality. In the fetal sex case the counselor may not wish to facilitate 
abortion for sex choice. It seems clear that the XYY information must be 
disclosed. Its very ambiguity is what makes it essential to allow the patient to 
choose her course of action .  The pregnant patient has a medical choice about 
abortion to make; the mother has choices about education and care for her son. 
The doctor may not make the choices for her by denying her the information she 
needs to make them. 
The same seems true with regard to fetal sex. A woman's reason for seeking 
an abortion is irrelevant to her constitutional rights (59). No doctor or hospital 
has to perform amniocentesis for sex choice or to make its facilities available 
for abortions (55). However, if an amniocentesis has been performed, the 
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118 DWORKIN & OMENN 
doctor's preference cannot deprive a woman of her full range of legal choices. 
Moreover, a legal rule that permitted fetal sex information to be withheld from 
women who revealed their desire to abort a child of the undesired sex would 
simply put a premium on lying, a position the law will surely try to avoid. 
Genetic information may be relevant to persons in addition to patients , 
spouses , and their offspring. For example , consider a diagnosis of hemophilia, 
an X-linked disease, that reveals the patient's mother to be a carrier of the gene 
for hemophilia. This means that each of the mother's sisters may have a 50% 
change of being a carrier, too. If a woman is a carrier, each of her sons has a 
50% chance of having hemophilia. May or must a genetic counselor attempt to 
locate and inform the sisters so that they may decide whether to seek amniocen­
tesis and to abort male fetuses? If the counselor does not know the carrier status 
of his patient's mother's sisters, may or must the counselor seek out and inform 
their daughters (the patient's cousins , the patient's mother's nieces) that they 
have a 25 % chance of being a hemophilia carrier, and that if they are a carrier 
each of their sons has a 50% chance of being affected ( 18, 57)? 
Obviously , the ideal way to deal with these issues is to obtain consent to 
contact and inform relatives . Sometimes ,  however, a person may be unwilling 
to give such consent. In these cases, conventional legal rules seem to suggest 
that the information should be retained in confidence. Fuller analysis, however, 
suggests that courts will probably require reasonable efforts to disclose. 
American law ordinarily imposes no obligation on a person to help a 
stranger, no obligation to be a Good Samaritan (31). The law does impose an 
obligation to maintain in confidence confidential information learned from a 
patient (40). Thus , at first blush, the law would appear to place liability on a 
genetic counselor who disclosed confidential information to a relative , and not 
to impose liability on such a counselor for failing to do so. However, unless one 
is governed by a specific statute that requires confidentiality (38, 44), this result 
seems unlikely. 
The rule that one need not become a Good Samaritan is an unattractive rule, 
retained primarily for practical reasons. When the practical reasons are not 
present, courts often create exceptions to the rule. Thus, the rule avoids 
line-drawing problems in cases where many bystanders fail to come to an 
accident victim's aid; it prevents us from stigmatizing persons whose failure to 
rescue represents panic rather than amorality; and it recognizes the futility of 
attempting to make sound actuarial judgements in order to provide failure-to­
rescue insurance. None of these problems exists in the genetic counseling 
context. One counselor or team is the obvious target for liability; time to think 
and plan how to do one's job, not panic-stricken response to an emergency, is 
involved; and the defendant's malpractice insurance is available to shift the 
loss. Thus, the reasons for not imposing duties to aid strangers are not present 
here. 
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LEGAL ASPECTS OF GENETICS 119 
Moreover, courts impose obligations to breach confidentiality when a super­
vening public interest requires the breach (40). An interest in promoting 
informed decision-making, reducing genetic disease, or reducing the impact of 
disease may be thought sufficiently more important than confidentiality to 
"supervene. " 
A notable California case suggests that the obligation in the genetic disease 
context will be to inform relatives rather than to protect confidences. In 
Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (70), a patient told his 
psychotherapist that he intended to kill his girlfriend. After the patient made 
good his threat, the psychotherapist was held liable for not taking adequate 
steps to warn the victim. The court held the public interest in avoiding homicide 
more important than the interest in maintaining a patient's confidences and 
rejected as speculative the argument that requiring disclosure would actually 
increase violence by discouraging people from seeking and cooperating in 
psychiatric care. 
The Tarasoffresult seems even more likely in the genetic disease context, 
where fears of overpredicting violence (here genetic disease) are not present. 
Moreover, one can argue that genetic counseling is by its very nature a 
family-based rather than an individually-based branch of medicine. Therefore, 
obligations ought to be to family members rather than only to individual 
patients . 
If this analysis is correct, counselors will sometimes be obligated to seek out 
patients' relatives and warn them of their genetic risks. How great an effort to 
locate such persons must they make? 
In accordance with traditional negligence principles, physicians and other 
counselors will have to make reasonable efforts to locate and warn relatives.  In 
the absence of previous decisions or well-established professional practices, it 
is difficult to say what reasonableness requires. Obviously, searching one's 
own telephone book for an unusual ethnic name is little enough to ask; combing 
the four comers of the world for relatives is too much. Courts will determine 
reasonableness on a case-by-case basis. The reasonableness standard also 
suggests that only potentially useful information has to be conveyed. Thus, for 
example,  it seems unlikely that one would have to disclose the existence of an 
incurable disease in a family to :i patient's asymptomatic sibling who is 
childless and past child-bearing age. 
All of this suggests that a counsekir's legal position in our hemophilia 
examples, while unclear , is probably improved by making reasonable efforts to 
locate relatives and inform them of their risks. The same principles are likely to 
apply to providing information to prospective spouses . Again reasonableness is 
the critical concept. In applying it courts will surely be able to distinguish 
between imposing an obligation to an acknowledged fiance (likely) and seeking 
out everyone the patient dates and might conceivably marry (unlikely) . 
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120 DWORKIN & OMENN 
Additional problems of sharing genetic information arise from the practice of 
adoption (3, 35, 36). An adopted child or his adoptive parents may seek access 
to information about the child's genetic heritage in order to make medical 
decisions about the child or to permit the child to make informed reproductive 
decisions. Similarly, counselors may learn that a patient had a child whom the 
patient surrendered for adoption. The counselors may wish to locate the child in 
order to inform him of his genetic risks. Finally , a person may embark on a 
search for biological relatives in an attempt to locate potential bone marrow or 
other organ donors (2, 38) .  
Traditionally, adoption records have been sealed i n  order to protect the 
privacy of biological parents ,  adoptive parents, and children. As Hansen 
& Omenn (35) have noted, all applicable statutes permit the records to be 
opened under certain circumstances. The usual requirement, whether articu­
lated in the statute or not, is a showing of good cause. A serious medical 
need for the information would usually qualify as good cause unless reveal­
ing the information seemed likely to do substantial harm. The likelihood 
of benefit from contacting the adoptive parents of a child newly found to be at 
risk for inheriting a gene for a particular disorder depends upon the clinical 
features of that disorder,  especially the feasibility of presymptomatic diagno­
sis, the severity of the disease, and the effectiveness of treatment. The cases 
that have been described involved Huntington disease, myotonic dystrophy, 
Fabry disease, von Willebrand disease, and Waardenburg syndrome. In all 
cases , the biological mothers requested that the genetic counseling provided 
for them and their children be shared with the adoptive family. Informal 
contacts through intermediaries in social agencies led to some misunderstand­
ings and complications and stimulated recommendations for better procedures 
under the aegis of the King County (Washington) Superior Court, Family Court 
Division (53c). 
Conscientious courts may work very hard to structure a remedy that will 
permit a person to learn relevant information while protecting others' identities. 
For example, In Application of George (2), an adopted child sought to open the 
adoption record to learn his biological mother's identity for the purpose of 
exploring the possibility of her becoming a bone marrow donor for him. The 
appellate court in Missouri ordered the trial court to seek the biological father 
and mother, to act as an intermediary , and to try to work the situation out. It 
refrained from ordering disclosure of the biological parents' identities and 
expressed its preference for avoiding disclosure. Cases like George suggest 
that, while resort to cumbersome legal procedures is still required to provide 
good genetic medical care in situations involving adoption, room for optimism 
about the outcome of those procedures exists. Courts seem sensitive to the need 
to protect both physical health and the psychological and social well-being to 
which privacy is so important. 
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LEGAL ASPECTS OF GENETICS 121 
ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTION TECHNOLOGIES 
Genetic counseling provides patients with information about reproductive and 
treatment options as well as about genetic disease and their own genetic 
situations. For many married couples information about reproductive options is 
especially important. Technology has now provided such couples with choices 
beyond the traditional ones of (a) bearing or risking the birth of an affected 
child, (b) refraining from conception, (c) sterilization, (d) abortion , and (e) 
adoption. The most practical technological ways to permit low-risk reproduc­
tion for couples at risk for transmitting genetic disorders are artificial insemina­
tion and surrogate motherhood. The range of reproductive options includes in 
vitro fertilization and embryo transfer (7a). In Israel , where use of donor sperm 
and surrogate mothers is prohibited, in vitro fertilization and embryo transfer 
are favored approaches for patients with mechanical causes of infertility (6 1a). 
At the time of this writing , legal ramifications of the technical uncertainties and 
ethical dilemmas arising from these developments were still speculative (7a, 
4Ia, 47a). 
ArtificiaL Insemination 
Artificial insemination is a widely used and well-established reproductive 
technology . Various estimates suggest that between 1000 and 20,000 babies 
are born annually in the United States as a result of artificial insemination, with 
current estimates running at about 6000 to 10,000 (20, 76, 77). A legal case 
about artificial insemination was decided as long ago as 1921 (54) . 
While traditionally artificial insemination using sperm from someone other 
than the husband (often called artificial insemination by donor or AID) has been 
used primarily as a way to deal with male infertility , the technique is in­
creasingly seen as a useful response to genetic disease as well. If a husband and 
wife both carry the gene for an autosomal recessive disease , they can reduce the 
risk of having an affected child from 25% in each pregnancy to virtually zero by 
using AID with sperm from a noncarrier male. Similarly,  a man with an 
autosomal dominant disease can spare his wife's child the 50% risk of being 
affected by consenting to AID using sperm from an unaffected man. 
To date, legal issues posed by AID have involved status relationships. The 
earliest cases explored the question of whether a wife who consented to AID 
had committed adultery (24, 49, 54, 76). This problem is no longer of much 
practical significance because of the nearly universal adoption of no-fault 
divorce in the United States. 
Much more important are the cases exploring the relationship between the 
husband and the child. The law in this regard is summarized through 1973 by 
Wadlington (77) and in a New York case, In re Adoption of Anonymous (42). lt 
is brought up to date in Wadlington's newer work (76) and in recent New Jersey 
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122 DWORKIN & OMENN 
(47) and Kansas (61) cases. Almost all of the cases involve married couples in 
which both the husband and wife consented to AID. In these cases, courts have 
been reluctant squarely to hold that the children born as a result of AID are 
legitimate. However, every reported case has reached the same result in the 
dispute before the court that it would have reached in a case involving the 
clearly legitimate offspring of the husband and wife .  Thus , the husband is 
obligated to pay child support, is entitled to visitation after divorce, may 
prevent another man from adopting the child, etc. 
These results give effect to the parties' plain intentions at the time they 
agreed to AID. They treat parenthood as a social, rather than a biological 
phenomenon. They serve the state's goals of providing two sources of support 
and nurture for children . They protect husbands, wives , and children. And they 
refrain from imposing any burden on doctors , donors, or donors' wives. They 
seem so eminently sensible that one should be able to assume that they will be 
followed in other states without regard to whether AID is used for genetic or 
infertility reasons. 
Nonetheless ,  uncertainty generated by the courts' reluctance to pronounce 
the children legitimate and by the vagaries of case-by-case development have 
led 24 legislatures to enact statutes dealing with AID (39a, 76). In addition, the 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws have offered a proposed uniform act on 
the subject (72). All the statutes reflect the same policy goals the courts have 
been pursuing. They attempt to have the husband-child relationship treated as 
legitimate. 
Unfortunately, the statutes are badly drafted and create more problems than 
they solve. They fail to accomplish their goals, and they force courts either to 
avoid their apparent implications or to violate their obvious policies (61). In 
short, they fail to provide and may actually retard the search for comprehen­
si veness and clarity . 
Comprehensiveness and clarity are widely prized . One may wonder, then, 
why the courts that have treated the husband-child relationship as legitimate 
have been reluctant to declare it always to be so . The most probable explanation 
is the courts' recognition of their own limited prescience and their desire to 
retain flexibility. This self-restraint has already served them well once in the 
artificial insemination context, and seems likely to be useful in at least two 
additional areas . 
In the New Jersey case of C.M. v. C.C. (13), a couple decided to have a 
child, but not sexual intercourse(!) before they were married . As no physician 
was willing to perform artificial insemination for them under these circum­
stances , the couple did it themselves. During the ensuing pregnancy the 
romance went out of their relationship, and the marriage did not occur. The 
lawsuit was an effort by the man to gain visitation rights to the child. He 
succeeded, a result which again seems sensible when viewed from the perspec­
tives of social policy and honoring expectations. The court's job in awarding 
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LEGAL ASPECTS OF GENETICS 123 
him visitation would have been much more difficult if earlier cases had 
decreed, for example, that a sperm donor can never be the father of the resulting 
child. 
Such a statement, whether by case or statute (72), would also cause chaos in 
any surrogate mother case , where it would raise the spectre of the intended 
father having no rights or obligations and the husband of a married surrogate 
enjoying "blessings" roughly akin to those involved in raising his wife's 
illegitimate child. 
Self-restraint has also left the courts free to deal creatively with another use 
of AID. In California a man opened a sperm bank to collect semen from Nobel 
laureates for the insemination of highly intelligent women (6). If a court 
disapproves of this use of AID as a speculative tool of positive eugenics, the 
easiest way to deal with it is to find on the facts of one case that a particular 
Nobel laureate donor must support the resulting child . The pool of Nobel 
donors will quickly dry up. Again this efficient, but moderate way to deal with 
a social problem would be precluded by a clear statement that AID children are 
always the legitimate children of their mother and her husband. 
The remaining questions about AID that seem likely to arise in the genetic 
disease context involve an additional form of genetic malpractice. Curie-Cohen 
et al (20) report that potential sperm donors are subjected to very little screening 
for genetic disorders. Are doctors who practice AID likely to be held liable 
when, ironically , a technique used to avoid a genetic disease causes one (57, 
pp. 68-70)? The responsibility for untoward outcomes in children of AID has 
not yet been clarified. Licensing of sperm banks and research on the long­
term storage and later use of sperm have been neglected, despite attention 
to the potential problems (52a). Finally, the "rights" of widows or others to 
sperm "stored" or donated years earlier by a deceased man are likely to be 
contested. 
As noted earlier, a physician's behavior is often evaluated by comparing it to 
the behavior of other physicians engaged in the same type of practice. This is 
not always the case, however. Occasionally courts simply dictate an acceptable 
level of practice and hold doctors to it (39). Artificial insemination may be 
practiced by so few physicians that judicial standard setting will appear attrac­
tive. This seems especially likely with regard to a practice that primarily 
requires history taking and testing for genetic characteristics, because courts 
may be able to understand the technical information involved well enough to 
feel equipped to deal with it, and because the new and rapidly changing nature 
of the field makes reliance on professional custom less fruitful than it usually is . 
As courts confront the question of negligence in the AID setting, they will be 
attempting to balance the need to maintain a supply of donors with the need to 
use only healthy men as donors. The balance will be struck with an eye toward 
two social policy questions: To what extent should AID to avoid genetic disease 
be encouraged; and who should bear the costs of children conceived through 
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124 DWORKIN & OMENN 
AID and born with genetic disease? We predict that courts will move in the 
direction of requiring at least some screening of potential donors, perhaps 
limited to known family history, known exposure to mutagens, testing for 
ethnically related conditions of fairly high incidence, and age. Whether more 
will be required cannot yet be determined. 
Surrogate Motherhood 
Surrogate motherhood employs the same technology as artificial insemination 
to overcome female instead of male infertility or to reduce the risk of genetic 
disease by eliminating the wife rather than the husband from the genetic chain. 
In the typical surrogate motherhood situation, a woman is artificially insemi­
nated with semen provided by a married man. If the woman becomes pregnant, 
she carries the baby to term and then surrenders all rights in it to the man and his 
wife. 
Typically, the married couple and the surrogate enter into a contract spelling 
out the rights and obligations of each (7, 49a, 54a, 76). A well-drafted contract 
may cover almost every eventuality from the surrogate's desire to keep the baby 
to the couple's refusal to accept it, and may include provisions about the 
surrogate's obligations to obtain prenatal care, eat properly, refrain from using 
alcohol, tobacco, drugs, caffeine, etc, and to avoid dangerous work. Problems 
may arise if the contract is oral or poorly drafted or if it fails to consider some 
eventuality. Even more basic problems arise about whether a court will enforce 
a surrogate motherhood contract or will find it unenforceable as against public 
policy. 
Very little law exists on the subject of surrogate motherhood. Kentucky trial 
courts have considered some questions, but only in Michigan have cases 
reached the appellate level. 
The Kentucky trial court cases point in different directions. In re Baby Girl 
(43) applied the presumption that a child born during marriage is the legitimate 
child of its mother and her husband and refused to allow a married woman who 
had served as a surrogate mother under a contract to terminate her parental 
rights. On the other hand, in Kentucky v. Surrogate Parenting Associates. Inc. 
(46), the court found no prohibition in Kentucky law of the payment of a fee for 
adoption or termination of parental rights. Howcver, the court observed that, in 
accordance with a Kentucky statute, any agreement by the surrogate to termi­
nate her parental rights is not binding unless made at least five days after the 
child's birth. Thus, a promise to surrender rights in the child made at the time of 
the original surrogate motherhood agreement would not be enforceable. 
Trial court decisions are not binding on courts deciding later cases. Only 
appellate decisions are authoritative in that sense. Michigan is the only state 
whose appellate courts have considered surrogate motherhood issues. In Doe v. 
Attorney General (23) and Syrkowski v. Appleyard (69), Michigan courts have 
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LEGAL ASPECTS OF GENETICS 1 25 
refused to allow the adoption code, the Paternity Act, and the artificial insemi­
nation statute to be used to effect the transfer of parental rights from a surrogate 
mother to the child's biological father and his wife. 
Thus, the legal picture for persons contemplating surrogate parenthood is 
unclear at best, discouraging at worst. As the Michigan cases make clear, old 
statutes designed to deal with other subjects cannot comfortably be applied in 
the surrogate motherhood context. Even the artificial insemination statutes are 
not helpful. Indeed,  to the extent that those statutes try to make AID children 
the legitimate offspring of their mother and her husband, they seem to impose 
obligations on the surrogate's husband, which obviously is not what the parties 
had in mind. If legislatures want to deal with surrogate parenting, they will 
need to draft new statutes. Should they do so? 
If one believes that surrogate parenting poses problems similar to those 
posed by AID, then no legislation is necessary. Courts have a great deal of 
experience dealing with status relationships, they have done a good job in the 
AID area, and no reason exists to think they will do less well here. Legislative 
approaches have been less successful. Uncertainty is a small price to pay for the 
flexibility that judicial resolution provides. 
On the other hand, if one believes that surrogate motherhood is significantly 
different from AID and should be regulated, then legislation is necessary 
because courts deciding cases after the fact cannot control behavior nearly as 
well as legislatures, which act prospectively, can. 
Is surrogate motherhood significantly different from AID? One might argue 
that it is because it poses two kinds of dangers that AID does not pose and that 
require controlling behavior. First, unlike AID, surrogate motherhood poses 
the risk of baby selling, a universally condemned practice, which, among other 
things, suggests profiteering at the expense of desperate couples. In addition, 
surrogate motherhood involves the surrogate for at least nine months. During 
that time her behavior regarding diet, prenatal care , abortion, etc must be 
controlled. 
On the other hand, one might argue that surrogate motherhood is not 
significantly different from AID. Semen is sold for AID use, and the difference 
between selling semen and selling babies may be more rhetorical than real. In 
any event, the sperm donor husband is not buying a baby; as its biological father 
he already has rights and obligations to it (46). The technology used in 
surrogate motherhood is the same as in AID. In surrogate motherhood, how­
ever, the technology benefits women, while in AID it benefits men. Insisting 
that the technology be controlled more strictly in surrogate motherhood than in 
AID may be viewed as discrimination against women. And the asserted need to 
control the surrogate's behavior during pregnancy is outrageously intrusive and 
probably unconstitutional (59). 
Obviously, what the right answer to these questions may be is unclear. Until 
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126 DWORKIN & OMENN 
the legislatures act, however, we suggest that courts should enforce surrogate 
motherhood agreements. Doing so will support the honest intentions of the 
parties at the time they entered into the agreement; it will assure at least healthy 
children of placement in a home where they are wanted and will be cared for; it 
reduces the chance for fraud and blackmail by the surrogate; it makes as little 
law (and, therefore, as few mistakes) as possible; and it alerts the legislature to 
what will happen if it does not act, thereby inviting the legislature to change the 
situation if it wishes to do so. 
APPLICATIONS OF GENETIC INFORMATION 
Gene Therapy 
At the present time developments in genetics are useful primarily to help 
families in their reproductive decision making and to promote accurate diagno­
sis in order to provide optimal treatment and training for persons with genetic 
disorders. However, other applications of genetic knowledge are possible, or 
may reasonably be expected to be developed. 
Recently, some attention has been focused on the possibility of gene therapy, 
that is , intervention to alter genes in order to cure genetic diseases in particular 
patients or even in entire families ( l a, 29, 33, 58). While gene therapy is not yet 
a reality, a few observations about potential legal questions may be made. 
Two types of gene therapy are envisioned. Somatic gene therapy is designed 
to correct a specific genetic defect in an individual without affecting the 
patient's germ line. Gametic therapy, on the other hand, is designed to alter the 
sperm or ova, thereby preventing the passing of a particular disease and 
eliminating the disease from an entire family line. 
Somatic gene therapy poses problems that do not differ qualitatively from 
those posed by other experimental medical techniques. Regulations for the 
protection of human subjects ( 15), including those requiring informed consent, 
must be complied with and careful technology assessment should be carried 
out. Persons using the new techniques will run typical risks of malpractice 
liability, but the genetic nature of the therapy ought not to require any special 
legal responses. 
Gametic therapy is more problematic. The possibility of altering germ lines 
to eliminate genetic characteristics calls to mind the discredited eugenics 
movement and the subtler dangers of trying to modify humanness by designing 
persons of specific physicial or mental types. Technologically we are very far 
from having such capability. Nonetheless, some may feel that the potential for 
abuse requires regulation or even prohibition of germ line experimentation. A 
more moderate response would be to rely on traditional approaches to the 
protection of human subjects, including fetuses ( 16), while recognizing that 
special risks to current subjects require careful scrutiny and conservatism about 
authorizing particular experiments. 
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Genetic Testing in the Workplace 
More realistic present issues are raised by efforts to perform genetic screening 
on workers or job applicants. Of course, if a test has poor predictive value, it 
should be rejected by the same criteria that should be applied to many current, 
non genetic tests, such as low back x-ray exams (58b). However, if a screening 
test were available that would reveal persons who are hypersusceptible to 
certain specific work hazards, such as oxidizing chemicals, numerous ques­
tions would arise. May or must employers use screening procedures to warn 
persons who are at risk? May or must they take steps to protect hypersusceptible 
individuals from risks? Specifically, may they refrain from hiring or promot­
ing, reassign, or fire such persons? At the present time none of these questions 
has been answered, although a major government study (19) , Congressional 
hearings, and legal (60) , medical (53d) , and policy (53e) analyses have been 
devoted to them. 
The Occupational Safety and Health Act (73) is designed to assure safe 
working conditions and to protect the health of workers, even the most sus­
ceptible (29a) . However, neither the Act nor the Agency acting under it has 
addressed the questions of employer use of medical surveillance information or 
of criteria for dealing with high risk employees. As Rothstein has noted, this 
silence "leaves everyone in the dark" (60, p. 1429). Systematic studies should 
be carried out with full cooperation of labor and management to demonstrate 
the value of a test and the attributable risk of a trait before any such testing could 
be justified (53d). 
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (74) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 (75) may provide some protection to persons whose employability or 
employment is adversely affected by genetic screening. The Rehabilitation Act 
is designed to protect otherwise qualified handicapped persons from discrimi­
nation in employment by federally assisted employers. At least one case has 
suggested that screening out qualified handicapped persons to avoid possible 
future injury may be permissible (26, 60) . Whether a person with a genetic 
predisposition to an occupational disease is handicapped is unclear. Because 
the Rehabilitation Act is designed to prevent discrimination against the severely 
handicapped, it may not protect persons with only slight genetic "imperfec­
tions" from discrimination (60) . 
An additional avenue for protection may be available under the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act. That act is designed to prevent employment discrimination based 
on race , color, religion, sex, or national origin. Many genetic diseases have a 
significantly different prevalence in different racial groups. Therefore, genetic 
testing may have the effect of reducing employment options on the basis of 
race. Unintentional discrimination or discrimination against an individual 
might be prohibited, even if the result of using the genetic screening test is 
offset by other devices that result in proportional representation for the affected 
racial group ( 12 ,  60). 
A
nn
u.
 R
ev
. P
ub
lic
 H
ea
lth
 1
98
5.
6:
10
7-
13
0.
 D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 w
w
w
.an
nu
al
re
vi
ew
s.o
rg
 
A
cc
es
s p
ro
vi
de
d 
by
 A
LI
: A
ca
de
m
ic
 L
ib
ra
rie
s o
f I
nd
ia
na
 o
n 
04
/2
2/
16
. F
or
 p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y.
128 DWORKIN & OMENN 
CONCLUSION 
The law of medical genetics is new and unformed. It provides little in the way 
of guidance or predictability. However, its freshness, lack of form, and lack of 
clarity provide a significant opportunity for health professionals,  lawyers , and 
policy makers to work together to move the law in sound directions . 
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